‘It was the first encounter against the other for both sides, thus, a preliminary skirmish only. But it became a final engagement for Magellan.’
WHEN war is reduced to its simplest elements, we find that there are only two ways in which an enemy can be met and defeated. Either the shock or the missile must be employed against him. In the one case the victor achieves success by throwing himself on his opponent, and worsting him in a hand-to-hand struggle by his numbers, his weight, the superiority of his arms, or the greater strength and skill with which he wields them. In the second case he wins the day by keeping up such a constant and deadly rain of missiles, that his enemy is destroyed or driven back before he can come to close quarters. Each of these methods can be combined with the use of very different arms and tactics, and is susceptible of innumerable variations. In the course of history they have alternately asserted their preponderance: in the early middle ages shock-tactics were entirely in the ascendant…” [C.W.C. Oman. The Art of War in the Middle Ages A.D. 378-1515. London: Oxford, 1885]
At Mactan, the Europeans did the first while the Filipinos did the second.
The Expeditionaries (according to Pigafetta) wanted to “prove how our lances wounded” but wound up “oppressed by the lances and stones which the enemy hurled.” The former (armed with corslets and helmets, mortars and muskets) wanted to prevail over the latter (equipped with javelins, bamboo spears tipped with iron, pointed stakes hardened with fire, and cutlasses). The attackers (49 on the ground, 11 remaining aboard the boats) believed that the day would be theirs. Against 1,500 natives defending their home turf?
Like the Stradiot light cavalry or the German ‘black bands’ of musketeers, the sword-and-buckler men of Spain were considered among the new forms of military efficiency in Europe in the 15th century. In fact: “The Spanish infantry of Gonsalvo de Cordova displayed once more to the military world the strength of the tactics of old Rome. They were armed, like the men of the ancient legion, with the short thrusting sword and buckler, and wore the steel cap, breast- and back-plates and greaves. Thus they were far stronger in their defensive armor than the Swiss whom they were about to encounter.” [Oman] Sword contra spear and armor versus skin, Magellan and his volunteers should have bested the Pintados.
A caveat from Machiavelli (“the most devoted admirer of the Spanish system”): “The infantry have for their defense a breast plate of iron, and for offense a lance nine arm-lengths long, which they call a pike, and a sword at their side, rather round in the point than sharp. This is the ordinary armament of the infantry today, for few have their arms and shins (protected by) armor, no one the head.”
“The German infantry has almost no armor in defending itself, and use pikes and swords for offense…see that the one without armor has no remedy, but the one well armored will have no difficulty in overcoming the first blow and the first passes of the pike: for in battles…the men go so that of necessity they accost each other in a way that they are attacked on the breast.” [Dell’arte della guerra. Written 1519-1520, published 1521]
Magellan (a Knight of the Order of Santiago) had armor and his three-quarter suit must have consisted of breast and back plates, rerebraces, vambraces, taces, tassets, and cuisses. [John Pohl and Adam Hook. The conquistador, 1492-1550] Pigafetta (a Knight of Rhodes) had armor, too. Pero Sanchez (aka Pedro Sanildes) of Sevilla was the armorer (as well as one of the Trinidad Captain’s servants). After the blood compact with the Limasawa Rajah, Magellan had even showed off one of his men-at-arms clad in offensive armor. But the suit radiates heat and it was summer in the Island. Moreover, the opponents must have had protective vest as well since Pigafetta’s glossary of Cebuano included “baluti” (“baloti”) — quilted armor.
The attackers included musketeers and crossbow-men who fired for half an hour from a distance. The gun was matchlock, a personal weapon, aka the arquebus, a “favorite Spanish weapon. At first, loading was slow. In the late Middle Ages a mechanism was developed to carry a slow match to the powder, its lever shaped like a letter S or serpent, a name then used for the weapon.” [The Routledge Companion to Medieval Warfare] As for the other weapon, the crossbow (12-inch bolt), which was essential in all Euro armies (and paired with the matchlock) was also known as the Arbalest — of low trajectory yet powerful.
Magellan the Knight brought his Arming-sword (“riding-sword”), which was useless since “he was unable to draw it more than half way, on account of a javelin wound which he had received in the right arm.” [The First Voyage Round the World by Antonio Pigafetta, translated by Lord Stanley of Alderley] Worse for the Portuguese commander, one of the Visayan defenders “with a great sword, like a great scimitar, gave him a great blow on the left leg, which brought the captain down on his face.”
Not the “sundan” (knife) or the “baladao” (dagger) but the “campilan” (cutlass). The Mactanese possessed “calasag” (shield) and “bangcao” (spear) as well.
So what was Magellan’s real problem? Where was the Destreza Verdadera? Did he misplace Machiavelli’s Rule 21? “Good Captains never come to an engagement unless necessity compels them, or the opportunity calls them.” What was the spark? What was the occasion? Zula (a Mactan chief) claimed that he would have sent more tributes to the Knight but for the obstacle presented by the other chief (“Cilapulapu, who refused to obey the king of Spagnia”). The requested reinforcement was “only one boatload of men on the next night” and the Portuguese thought that was too meager: “The captain-general decided to go thither with three boatloads.” Pigafetta and his crew-mates “begged him repeatedly not to go, but he, like a good shepherd, refused to abandon his flock.”
Those two goats from Zula became the price of the life of Magellan who should have grasped Machiavelli’s Rule 3: “Never lead your soldiers into an engagement unless you are assured of their courage, know they are without fear, and are organized, and never make an attempt unless you see they hope for victory.” Taking a poisoned arrow to his right leg, Magellan ordered a slow retreat “but the men took to flight, except six or eight of us who remained with the captain.” The Knight took another disabling wound to his other leg (a cutlass cut), hence, no more standing in the water. Fell face down. Down for the count. The End.
Machiavelli’s Rule 13: “…make your army experienced, and learn (the strength) of a new enemy by skirmishes, before you come to an engagement with him.” It was the first encounter against the other for both sides, thus, a preliminary skirmish only. But it became a final engagement for Magellan.
And a victory for Lapulapu. Kadaugan sa Mactan.
